TPG-Axon Responds to SandRidge Energy′s Statement Regarding Related Party Transactions

TPG-Axon, beneficial owner of 6.7% of the outstanding shares of
SandRidge Energy, Inc. (NYSE: SD) (the 'Company?), today issued the
following statement and rebuttal to SandRidge′s press release regarding
related party transactions issued Friday, January 25, 2013.

'The Board′s disappointing response on Friday shows disregard for both
facts and stockholders. Nowhere in its press release did the Company
refute the accuracy of the facts we presented. Therefore, there can be
no doubt that SandRidge′s Board of Directors has failed stockholders by
allowing its CEO's immediate family, using entities he created or
funded, to compete with the Company in one of the most crucial aspects
of its primary business ? acquiring the mineral rights to land in the
Mississippian. Furthermore, since many of the directors have either
long-standing business relationships with Mr. Ward or have had direct
business relations with the Company, we disagree with the very
characterization of this Board as independent. For the Board to dismiss
our concerns as "entirely unremarkable′ is in fact remarkable,? said
TPG-Axon.

TPG-Axon notes the following in response to the primary points made in
the statement from the SandRidge′s Board of Directors:

WCT Resources' Independence:

The Board of Directors is asking its stockholders to believe that the
'management of WCT Resources?including Mr. Ward's son?are independent of
the Company.' The following facts continue to be true:

• 
  The CEO of WCT Resources is the son of the SandRidge′s CEO;
  
• 
  WCT Resources appears to have few employees and resources relative to
  SandRidge;
  
• 
  WCT Resources and SandRidge shared an address ?until last ?year;
  
• 
  WCT Resources is owned by trusts established by Tom and Sch′ree Ward
  and whose trustee is a SandRidge employee;
  
• 
  The COO of WCT Resources recently worked at SandRidge.
  

These facts, along with the significant and curious overlap of activity
should cause a reasonable person, at the minimum, to be skeptical of
claims of independence.

Adjacent or Advance Acquisitions:

The detailed examples that TPG-Axon provided of advance or adjacent
acquisitions by WCT Resources are illustrative and are just examples
of the significant overlap in both location and timing between the
activity of WCT Resources and SandRidge in the Mississippian. From the
data TPG-Axon has reviewed so far, this pattern of activity is not
rare; ?it is frequent, - particularly in more recent expansions in the
Mississippian.

The Board claims that 'virtually all companies active in the play are
likely to have some interests that could be characterized as adjacent to
the Company′s holdings?. Yet, it is simply not true that all companies
have frequent correlation of activity, in both time and place. Even the
Company, in the Consent Revocation Statement it recently filed, proudly
trumpets that SandRidge created value by 'quietly and inexpensively?
acquiring rights ahead of other companies.
Therefore, for WCT Resources to appear frequently
alongside or in advance of SandRidge is notable, and not 'entirely
unremarkable.?

'We challenge the Board to show that the pattern of overlap between WCT
Resources and SandRidge is modest compared to that of others. It is
simply astonishing that family-controlled entities are active in the
same business that SandRidge is active in. It is even more astonishing
that these entities have frequently, as opposed to rarely, appeared
ahead of, or alongside, SandRidge in areas of interest,? said TPG-Axon.

Inter-Company Transactions:

The direct transactions between WCT Resources and SandRidge are a small
fraction of the overall pattern of overlap between WCT Resources and
SandRidge, simply because much of the property or rights acquired ?by WCT
Resources appear to have been kept, or sold to third parties. If WCT
Resources buys land or rights in advance of the Company, there is
potential for harm to SandRidge stockholders, whether that land is kept
or sold, and regardless of whom it is sold to.

The vast majority of transactions in which WCT Resources acts in
advance, or alongside, of SandRidge have never been disclosed by the
Company. For only the small percentage of actual direct transactions in
which land or rights were flipped to SandRidge, the Company has had very
limited disclosure ? this is the 'one quarter of one percent? the
Company refers to. Yet, even for these transactions, we do not believe
the disclosure has been sufficient. As an example, to provide limited
disclosure regarding transactions with WCT Resources, and yet not
disclose that those very assets had been held by TLW Land & Cattle just
months before being sold to SandRidge, is a significant omission.
TPG-Axon has the following questions for the Board:

• 
  Why did the Company not disclose the history of ownership of those
  assets?
  
• 
  Why were assets transferred to the 'independently managed? WCT
  Resources and then resold to SandRidge shortly thereafter?
  
• 
  Is the Board now taking the position that TLW Land & Cattle is also an
  'independently managed? company?
  
• 
  If not, then why did Mr. Ward, in his role at TLW Land & Cattle,
  choose to sell rights to WCT Resources only to then choose, in his
  role as CEO of SandRidge, to buy them for the Company?
  
• 
  If these transactions were appropriate, why did the Company not
  disclose the history of ownership and the reasons for the complex
  transfer?
  
• 
  Even leaving aside the claim that WCT Resources is independently
  managed, is it not relevant to disclose that the very assets being
  bought by the Company were indirectly owned by the CEO, by virtue of
  his ownership of TLW, just months prior to such acquisitions?
  

Overall, the conflicts of interest, and potential for harm to the
Company and unfair gain for others, are significant in all of these
transactions.

When SandRidge signs a joint venture agreement, as it has with companies
like Repsol and Atinum, there is benefit for SandRidge stockholders. The
Company and its stockholders bear the initial expense and overhead of
identifying opportunities. ?However, the partners then pay a premium to
the Company for a share of the land, and share in the expense of
developing the land.

On the other hand, if in fact, family-controlled entities have gained
information and advantage through the relationship with Mr. Ward and
SandRidge, then by contrast, the situation with WCT Resources and other
Ward family entities is remarkably advantageous for them. In such
circumstances, SandRidge would bear the expense of huge overhead, which
presumably would help in identifying attractive opportunities while WCT
Resources would appear to reach that same result with little overhead
spending or resources. SandRidge would also, in such circumstances, bear
the cost of drilling to prove whether the land was valuable or not. If
it was valuable, WCT Resources would benefit from having adjacent land,
even without having borne that cost.

'Just like the earlier Executive Well Participation Plan program, which
Mr. Ward benefitted handsomely from, there would be an unfair sharing of
risk and reward. However, at least with the Executive Well Participation
Plan, the Company disclosed its existence, albeit to a limited degree.
In this case, by adopting the view that WCT Resources is an
"independently managed company,′ SandRidge has avoided any disclosure of
the significant potential for conflict of interest and unfair gain for
the Ward family,? said TPG-Axon.

The Board's response also ignores a number of the other inconvenient
facts and questions pointed out in TPG-Axon′s presentation. Most
notably, in its response, the Board does not address any of the other
persons or entities related to Mr. Ward that appear frequently alongside
SandRidge in the acquisition of land and mineral rights, including 192
Investments and Sch′ree Ward. Are stockholders to believe that those
occurrences are also simply coincidences?

The Board also claims that it does not technically have the ability to
stop WCT Resources from engaging in any particular business. While that
may be literally true (despite the fact that such activity was being
conducted by a company which shared an address with SandRidge, and whose
economic benefit flowed to a trust controlled by a SandRidge employee
for the benefit of the CEO′s children), it was not beyond the Board's
power to require that Mr. Ward step down as CEO if related entities did
not cease their competitive activities, because it is inappropriate for
SandRidge's CEO to be in such a conflicted position.

'We believe the time has long passed to simply "consider′ the
appointment of independent counsel ? that should have been done already.
The Board should suspend Mr. Ward while they engage credible experts to
analyze the transactions and review the behavior. We challenge the Board
to either do something, or make clear they will not. Stockholders cannot
afford more inactivity or delay by their Board,? concluded TPG-Axon.

About TPG-Axon Capital

TPG-Axon Capital is a leading global investment firm. Through offices in
New York, London, Hong Kong and Tokyo, TPG-Axon invests across global
markets and asset classes.

TPG-AXON MANAGEMENT LP, TPG-AXON PARTNERS GP, L.P., TPG-AXON GP, LLC,
TPG-AXON PARTNERS, LP, TPG-AXON INTERNATIONAL, L.P., TPG-AXON
INTERNATIONAL GP, LLC, DINAKAR SINGH LLC AND DINAKAR SINGH
(COLLECTIVELY, 'TPG-AXON?) HAS FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (THE 'SEC?) A DEFINITIVE CONSENT STATEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING
CONSENT CARD TO BE USED TO SOLICIT WRITTEN CONSENTS FROM THE
STOCKHOLDERS OF SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC. IN CONNECTION WITH TPG-AXON'S
INTENT TO TAKE CORPORATE ACTION BY WRITTEN CONSENT. ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF
SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC. ARE ADVISED TO READ THE DEFINITIVE CONSENT
STATEMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOLICITATION OF WRITTEN
CONSENTS BY TPG-AXON, STEPHEN C. BEASLEY, EDWARD W. MONEYPENNY, FREDRIC
G. REYNOLDS, PETER H. ROTHSCHILD, ALAN J. WEBER AND DAN A. WESTBROOK
(COLLECTIVELY, THE 'PARTICIPANTS') FROM THE STOCKHOLDERS OF SANDRIDGE
ENERGY, INC. BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO THE PARTICIPANTS. THE DEFINITIVE
CONSENT STATEMENT AND FORM OF WRITTEN CONSENT HAVE BEEN FURNISHED TO
SOME OR ALL OF THE STOCKHOLDERS OF SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC. AND ARE, ALONG
WITH OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC'S WEB
SITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV.
IN ADDITION, TPG-AXON WILL PROVIDE COPIES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONSENT
STATEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING CONSENT CARD WITHOUT CHARGE UPON REQUEST.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS AND A DESCRIPTION OF THEIR DIRECT OR
INDIRECT INTERESTS BY SECURITY HOLDINGS IS CONTAINED IN THE DEFINITIVE
CONSENT STATEMENT ON SCHEDULE 14A FILED BY TPG-AXON WITH THE SEC ON
JANUARY 18, 2013. THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE OBTAINED FREE OF CHARGE FROM THE
SOURCES INDICATED ABOVE.

MacKenzie Partners, Inc.

Dan Burch or Larry Dennedy,
212-929-5500

or

TPG-Axon:

Anton Nicholas,
203-682-8245

Anton.Nicholas@icrinc.com

Phil
Denning, 203-682-8246

Phil.Denning@icrinc.com

Jason
Chudoba, 646-277-1249

Jason.Chudoba@icrinc.com